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Robinson 1 
 
 
The crusades were a Christian enterprise. They were proclaimed in the name of God for 
the service of the church. Religion was the thread which bound crusaders together and united 
them in a single holy cause. When crusaders set out for a holy war they took a vow not to their 
feudal lord or king, but to God. The Fourth Crusade was no different. Proclaimed by Pope 
Innocent III in 1201, it was intended to recover Christian control of the Levant after the failure of 
past endeavors. Crusading vows were exchanged for indulgences absolving all sins on behalf of 
the church. Christianity tied crusaders to the cause. That thread gradually came unwound as 
Innocent’s crusade progressed, however.  
Pope Innocent III preached the Fourth Crusade as another attempt to secure Christian 
control of the Holy Land after the failures of previous crusades. Like these previous crusades, the 
Fourth Crusade failed to regain lasting Christian control of religious sites in Palestine. The 
Fourth Crusade is a unique event in medieval history, though, because its failure resulted from 
attacking Christian cities in complete contradiction to the pope’s original intention. The main 
army of crusaders initially converged on the Republic of Venice, where leaders had agreed to a 
contract with the Venetians for transport to the Holy Land. Yet, unable to fulfill its end of the 
contract, the crusading army diverted from its original course and begin attacking Christian cities 
in the Mediterranean. This led the crusade to sack the Byzantine capitol of Constantinople and 
establish a short-lived Latin empire on its ruins. The crusaders failed to fulfill their original vow 
to fight for control of the Holy Land while instead targeting fellow Christians.  
While some sources have focused on superficial, sometimes even frivolous issues, the 
majority of historians direct their research to explaining the crusade’s diversion to 
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Constantinople.1 Despite this common focus, a major area of disagreement remains among 
scholars in determining what caused the crusade’s diversion. While the contention that the 
diversion was inevitable has all but disappeared among academic writings, historians are unable 
to come to a consensus on what factors led to what may be called the greatest accident of history. 
An analysis of the sources reveals the need for a revision of historiographical trends and a new 
interpretation of the crusade’s development that incorporates the entire socio-political situation 
surrounding the event. Current historiography tends to examine the crusade strictly from the 
perspective of crusaders and crusade leaders and subscribes to various, sometimes contradictory, 
interpretations. None of these dominant approaches or interpretations, however, adequately 
incorporates the much broader theological or socio-political trends, such as the relationship 
between clergy and common crusaders or the dynamics of authority permeating the crusade, 
which may have directed the crusade’s events.  
Robert Browning, a Byzantine historian attempting to explain the Ottoman conquest of 
Constantinople, lays the foundations of the events of 1453 in the events of 1204.2 He asserts that 
the Byzantine Empire was never able to recover from the catastrophic events of the Fourth 
Crusade. Browning references the idea of a “balance of power” in Anatolia, which was heavily 
skewed away from the Byzantines following the Latin occupation. He writes that this created a 
void which the Ottomans continued to fill leading up to 1453.3 While the Byzantines were 
decimated, the Ottomans continued to grow stronger within extremely close proximity. This 
                                                          
1 The most notable example of research unhelpfully independent of scholarly debates is Zdislaw Pentek’s brief 
article on food provision, in which the author spends about five pages discussing crusaders’ eating habits with 
sources which he admits mention almost nothing about the subject. Zdislaw Pentek, “The Fourth Crusade and the 
Problem of Food Provision in the Accounts of Robert de Clari and Geoffroy de Villehardouin,” Studia Historiae 
Oeconomicae 32, no. 1 (Dec. 2014): 109-114. 
2 Robert Browning, The Byzantine Empire (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 
xiii. 
3 Ibid., xix, 290-291. 
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powerful combination is what Browning argues led to the Ottoman capture of the city. In his 
words, “the final blow was delivered by the Ottomans, but the fatal injury was inflicted in 
1204.”4    
The Fourth Crusade was an anomaly of theology and ecclesiastical authority in which 
laymen openly defied clerical directives and the clergy split against itself. At certain points the 
clergy became increasingly irrelevant as their role was replaced by common crusaders answering 
their own theological questions and earthly considerations such as fundraising and crusade unity 
took precedence over theology, while the entire clerical base, including the pope, was unable to 
come to a unified consensus regarding the expedition's sanctity. 
Historiography 
Scholarship on the Fourth Crusade commenced immediately after the sack of 
Constantinople. The leading consensus evolved to assert that the crusade was an act of treason. 
While ideas of a formal scheme to attack Constantinople have been dismissed as relying on a 
misreading of the sources, this theory enjoys a much more persistent conception in the belief that 
calculated Venetian greed led the crusade to its final destination.5 Edward Gibbon’s renowned 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, as one influential example of this theory, portrays the 
crusade as a pattern of ambition and avarice, an expedition often sowed with the “seeds of 
discord and scandal.”6  
This gradually changed as modern 20th Century historians began to distance themselves 
from that idea in favor of a theory of accidents. Donald Queller and Gerald Day, professors of 
                                                          
4 Browning, The Byzantine Empire, 253. 
5 Christopher Tyerman, The Debate on the Crusades (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 205.  
6 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: Strahan & Cadell, 
1776). 
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history at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, contributed most to the Venetians' 
vindication with their article, "Some Arguments in Defense of the Venetians on the Fourth 
Crusade." According to them, the treason theory has its roots in French historian Louis de Mas 
Latrie’s indictment of Dandolo and the Venetians in the mid-19th Century, from which 
generations of crusade scholars erroneously followed.7 They challenge the resulting assumptions 
that the Venetians did not share the piety of the crusaders and that they manipulated the crusade 
to make it more advantageous to their trade interests. They hypothesize that the Venetians 
garnered no selfish motives and were committed to the crusade for its own merits, fostering no 
ulterior motives. They claim that, while the Venetians certainly had some commercial 
advancement in mind, they were also heavily inspired by faith and made only reasonable 
demands on the crusaders. Their sources are relatively simple, however, yet apparently adequate 
to make such strong assertions on the Venetian’s motives. The article draws frequently from 
original chronicles of the crusade, such as those of Villehardouin, Clari, Gunther of Pairis and 
Dandolo, to reveal how pro-Venetian attitudes and exonerating information can be found in these 
sources.8  
Despite the clear summation provided by Queller and Day, and their sound rebuttal of the 
theory of treason, the theory of accidents began development among historians for years prior. 
French archivist Natalis de Wailly is sometimes credited with establishing the dispute between 
the two theories in 1874. His work is considered responsible for the positions taken by the far 
more influential Comte de Riant on this matter.9 Riant became one of the most eminent and 
                                                          
7 Donald Queller and Gerald Day, “Some Arguments in Defense of the Venetians on the Fourth Crusade,” The 
American Historical Review 81, no. 4 (October 1976): 717. 
8 Ibid., 717-737.  
9 A. Frolow, “La déviation de la 4e Croisade vers Constantinople: Problème d'histoire et de doctrine,” Revue de 
l'histoire des religions 145, no. 2 (1954): 170; The theory of accidents is prevalent in the work of European crusade 
historians, sometimes referred to as either la théorie de circonstances fortuites, Intrigentheorie or Zuffalstheorie. 
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fervent champions of the idea of a pre-established conspiracy by the Venetians.10 His writing 
speaks often of Venetian political treason and the appearance of a secret treaty between Dandolo 
and the Egyptian sultan to divert the crusade, while also characterizing the Venetian 
contributions to the crusade as “fraudulent.”11  
Another late nineteenth century historian, Edwin Pears, assumes the same interpretation 
as Riant, crediting him and his scholarly reputation as the influence for his own work on the 
crusade. Pears agrees completely with Riant’s theory of a premeditated Venetian plot to alter the 
crusade’s course.12 Pears believes that scheme to attack Constantinople was rooted 
in Dandolo's desire for revenge and was the natural conclusion of decades of Venetian struggle 
against the empire. He points to examples such as past treaty violations, the transfer of trading 
privileges to Genoa, and the rumor that Dandolo was blinded by the emperor as the basis for the 
doge's "inextinguishable hatred" of the Greeks.13 Pears adds an additional layer to Riant’s theory, 
though, by arguing that Phillip of Swabia pre-planned the attack on Constantinople to place 
Alexius IV on the throne and shared his intentions with Boniface when they met in 1201.14 
While he believes there was a premeditated plot, collusion between Dandolo, Boniface and 
Phillip of Swabia, he also argues that Innocent used his power and authority in an unsuccessful 
campaign to prevent the plot's execution and thus shares none of the blame for the crusade’s 
conclusion.15 Pears creates an intriguing characterization of the crusade, describing the crusaders 
                                                          
10 Riant’s contemporary, Edwin Pears, credits him with dividing the historiography on treason theory into ideas 
of premeditated and non-premeditated plots. Edwin Pears, The Fall of Constantinople, being the Story of the Fourth 
Crusade (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1886), xi-x. 
11 Paul Riant, Innocent III, Philippe de Souabe et Boniface de Montferrat : examen des causes qui modifièrent, 
au détriment de l'empire grec, le plan primitif de la quatrième croisade (Paris, V. Palme, 1875), 15-16.   
12 Pears, Fall of Constantinople, xi.  
13 Ibid., 232-234.  
14 Ibid., 238-240.  
15 Ibid., xi, 266.  
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as "prisoners" and the Venetians as their "jailers." The work of Queller and Day is thus best 
regarded as an essential part of this debate's culmination, but by no means its beginning. 
Historians have now commonly adopted the view that the Fourth Crusade's diversion to 
Constantinople was a complex series of accidents. This new consensus asserts that the crusade’s 
end result was an unintended consequence which no party foresaw until it was too late. Even in 
spite of clear direction toward that end from those such as Alexius III or Doge Dandolo prior to 
Zara, historians believe the crusade as a whole was directed only by chance. Recent popular 
books by Jonathan Phillips, Jonathan Riley-Smith and Christopher Tyerman adhere to this theory 
in their narratives of the crusade.16 David Nicolle also incorporates this theory into his 
discussions of the crusade, asserting that the events of 1204 were neither direct nor 
unavoidable.17 He instead focuses on the specific circumstances that arose during the crusade, 
particularly “the realities of power, money, climate and the availability of food,” to explain how 
it was gradually pushed toward Constantinople.18 The presence of such a resolute scholarly 
consensus does not grant it immunity from criticism, though. Michael Angold of the University 
of Edinburgh is hesitant to accept this view because he believes it far too expediently relieves 
historians from their duty to dig deeper into the crusade’s diversion, arguing that “in one sense 
all of history is an accident.”19 Despite minimal objections, the theory of accidents remains the 
prevailing scholarship. The diversion, as it is now commonly understood, was based on the 
                                                          
16 Jonathan Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, New York: Penguin, 2004; Jonathan 
Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A Short History, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014; Christopher Tyerman, 
Fighting for Christendom: Holy War and the Crusades, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. These books 
primarily offer a clear beginning to end narrative that is useful for anyone trying to grasp the basics of current 
attitudes toward the crusade. Tyerman takes a more cautious approach to the accident theory, but he seems only to 
have issues of semantics. He prefers explaining the crusade as “pragmatism, idealism and opportunism” rather than 
as an accident per se.   
17 David Nicolle, The Fourth Crusade 1202-04: The Betrayal of Byzantium (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 5. 
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Michael Angold, “The Road to 1204: The Byzantine Background to the Fourth Crusade,” Journal of 
Medieval History 25, no. 3 (1999): 257.  
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circumstances that arose, rather than any party's deliberate plot to hijack the crusade. It is within 
this framework that historians now theorize about the Fourth Crusade.  
In spite of the common acceptance of the theory of accidents, some modern historians 
still cling to the notion that the crusade’s diversion was directed by Venetian avarice. The most 
prominent perpetuator of these ideas is Steven Runciman. In many of his widely-lauded works 
Runciman hedges often on the question of Venice’s motives. His writing exhibits what can be 
viewed as a weaker version of the treason theory advanced in the nineteenth century. While he 
does not deny the influence of several other factors on the crusade’s direction, he defies the post-
Queller and Day consensus by his inclusion of Venetian avarice as a controlling dynamic on the 
crusade’s outcome. According to Runciman, the crusade was not directed to Constantinople 
through Venice’s passive guidance but was actively “lured” by its “jealous greed.”20 In his often-
referenced History of the Crusades, Runciman goes so far as to suggest an element of deception 
and claim that the Franks were “outwitted by the Venetians,” which is a direct contrast to the 
ideas of Queller and Day.21 On the other hand, Jonathan Harris approaches a more minor form of 
treason theory by identifying Boniface as potentially the primary cause of the diversion. He 
postulates that Boniface was enticed by the riches of Constantinople and supported the diversion 
as a way to preserve the endangered crusade.22 Though Harris recognizes his argument as an 
unconfirmed interpretation, he believes the circumstances of Alexius' approach of Boniface 
support its plausibility.23 Current overall scholarship remains soundly committed, however, to 
the task of explaining the crusade in terms of the unpredictable circumstances that arose.  
                                                          
20 Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 3.  
21 Steven Runciman, The History of the Crusades, Volume 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 
129.  
22 Jonathan Harris, Constantinople: Capital of Byzantium (New York: Continuum, 2007), 162-163. 
23 Harris, Constantinople, 163. 
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Thomas Madden argues that the crusade’s fate was a result of the competing, and often 
contradictory, requirements between the crusaders’ spiritual vow and the secular contracts to 
which they bound themselves. The crusading vow, the Treaty of Venice and the Treaty of Zara 
form the basis of the crusade’s contractual obligations. Crusaders had to constantly adapt their 
actions to their contractual agreements, according to Madden, which directed the series of events 
leading the crusade to Constantinople.24  
Historians, however, have largely ignored the role of theology both on the crusade's 
diversion and the individual crusaders. This is perhaps the great irony of decades of studies on 
the Fourth Crusade, considering how crusading was inherently a theological act. By instead 
focusing on the political aspects of the events, scholar bypass what was likely the greatest 
driving force behind the crusade. 
Alfred Andrea, introducing his translation of the Hystoria Constantinopolitana, suggests 
that "modern historians have too often misrepresented the Fourth Crusade as a purely secular 
venture."25 This is an unfortunate facet of much of the current historiography on the crusade. It 
neglects the theological intricacies that took place on the crusade, many of which resulted from 
the evolving relationship between crusaders, the clergy and the religious establishment. To use 
Andrea’s phrasing, the crusade itself was a “religious expression.”26 The journey’s events 
changed the religious interpretations and sentiments of many crusaders. It challenged the 
traditional religious atmosphere of Christendom. From this perspective, the crusade was anything 
but secular. Religion, and sometimes the very lack thereof, played a substantial role in the 
                                                          
24 Thomas Madden, “Vows and Contracts in the Fourth Crusade: The Treaty of Zara and the Attack on 
Constantinople in 1204,” The International History Review 15, no. 3 (August 1993): 441-468. 
25 Alfred Andrea, trans., The Capture of Constantinople, The Hystoria Constantinopolitana of Gunther of Paris 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 40.  
26 Ibid., 41. 
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crusade’s events and the influence they had on crusaders. Because of the crusade’s reformative 
nature regarding traditional religious authority, the Fourth Crusade was perhaps the most 
religiously conscious crusade of medieval history.  
Raymond Schmandt examines the religious and ethical musing of common crusaders by 
applying the philosophy of just war theory to the crusade. He argues that the crusaders were 
constantly engaged in introspection about the justifiability of their actions and did not blindly 
accept the sanctity of their diversions to Zara and Constantinople, but had to actively justify them 
as a just war. Schmandt describes the interpretations of just war theory that were prevalent at the 
time and shows how the crusaders compared them to their own actions in moral reflection. 
Schmandt ultimately agrees with the crusaders’ conclusions that the crusade was a just war 
according to the standards of the time. Schmandt’s theory is significant to understanding the 
crusade because it implies that the crusaders were not just blindly following the group. They 
exhibited a level of autonomy that made attacking Christians a conscious choice. Schmandt’s 
article offers an interpretation often neglected by historians—that the individual crusaders were 
responsible for the crusade’s events because they amended their own viewpoints to see nothing 
wrong with their actions.27 
Schmandt has been the most helpful in emphasizing how the crusaders' concepts of 
theology played a role in the crusade's course of events. He does not, however, focus on reasons 
specifically why such introspection was necessary. Schmandt neglects to examine the ambivalent 
responses to crusaders' theological questions from those in positions of influence. The 
shortcomings of his work arise when he places too much emphasis on the crusaders themselves 
                                                          
27 Raymond Schmandt, “The Fourth Crusade and Just War Theory,” The Catholic Historical Review 61, no. 2 
(April 1975): 191-221.  
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acting as interpreters of faith when, in reality, every convention of the time dictated they turn to 
the clergy for matters of theological debate. The only reason they would take the task upon 
themselves is if the answers provided by the clergy were insufficient.  
For the purpose of examining the clergy’s impact on the crusade, and the theological 
implications of it, the narrative of Gunther of Pairis is perhaps the most revealing source. 
Gunther recorded the observations and tales of Abbot Martin, who oversaw a Cistercian 
monastery, when he returned from the crusade. Gunther’s chronicle, the Hystoria 
Constantinopolitana, provides the most detailed source from the viewpoint of a cleric who 
actually traveled with the crusade.  
Just as the crusade was the epitome of division between Eastern and Western Christians, 
however, it was equally divisive among the Latin crusaders. The Fourth Crusade is best viewed 
as an ideological tug-of-war between two opposing concepts of theology. While Raymond 
Scmandt presents a firm groundwork to examine the theological intricacies of the crusade, this 
aspect of the expedition has been left virtually untouched for the past forty years. 
Participation in the Crusade by Clergy 
The rebellious attitudes of the crusade's laymen and nobility is what sets the crusade apart 
from the many others. Every precedent laid before the Fourth Crusade suggested the church held 
supreme authority over the theological matters of a holy war. According to Fulcher de Chartres, 
when Pope Urban II commenced preaching of the First Crusade at Clermont he clarified that 
"[crusaders] must especially let all matters that pertain to the church be controlled by the law of 
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the church." Urban specifically requested that the crusade "keep the church and the clergy in all 
its grades entirely free from the secular power.”28 
The chronicles are unclear exactly how many clergy traveled with the crusaders, and the 
nature of history deems it impossible to ever know for sure how strong of a presence the church 
had in the crusade compared with other crusaders. Clari mentions that there were so many clergy 
that he is unable to include them all in his narrative, despite discussing scores of crusaders by 
name.29 Their importance to a crusading army is undoubtable, though. Religion was the standard 
against which all else was applied for crusaders.30 Interpretations of the crusade and proper 
courses of action to take depended on analogous interpretations of religion which the clergy was 
trained to readily supply.  
Theological Uncertainty 
The Fourth Crusade was rife with dissent, debate and, the natural product of the two, 
uncertainty. This, then, begs the question of whether the events of the crusade were caused by 
theological uncertainty or the theological uncertainty was caused by the crusade's events. The 
evidence seems to point to the latter 
The Venetians, with Doge Dandolo at the forefront, suggested the crusade aid Venice in 
reclaiming the Adriatic city of Zara to relieve part of the debt. Zara, however, was a Christian 
city. Its inhabitants followed Western Christianity and recognized the pope's supremacy. 
                                                          
28 Fulcher de Chartres, “Urban II: Speech at Council of Clermont, 1095, according to Fulcher of Chartres,” 
Internet Medieval History Sourcebook, accessed November 30, 2016, 
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-fulcher.html.  
29 Robert de Clari, “Robert of Clari’s account of the Fourth Crusade,” De Re Militari, accessed November 30, 
2016, http://deremilitari.org/2014/01/robert-of-claris-account-of-the-fourth-crusade/.  
30 Schmandt, “Fourth Crusade,” 194.  
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Furthermore, its ruler was King Emico of Hungary, who had taken the crusading vow.31 His 
property was thus under papal protection, and the crusaders were obligated to protect the 
property of those who took the cross.32 The crusaders were aware of these realities and 
recognized that if they attacked this city the crusade would be turning inward against itself.33 
Dispute arose over whether this was a permissible act in the context of the crusading vow. 
The plans for Zara were not immediately revealed to the entire crusading army, however. 
They were initially known only to the doge and the nobility, who organized the plan and 
clandestinely agreed on it. Clari suggests that “none save the men of the highest estate” knew of 
the plan prior to landing at Zara.34 When the crusade’s intention was finally revealed to the mass 
of crusaders, it triggered a moral rift in the host and led to the difficult choice of disobeying the 
crusade leaders or defying the pope.35  
Despite the lack of presence by the clergy in the moral reasoning of the laymen, the 
crusade clerics nonetheless shared their concerns. One of the more ominous splits between the 
clergy occurred just prior to the sack of Zara, in the midst of the heated debate between crusaders 
regarding the permissibility of besieging Zara. This schism was overwhelmingly dominated by 
disputations between two clergymen: the Abbot of Vaux-de-Cernay and the Abbot of Loos. 
Following Dandolo's revelation of the plan to attack Zara, the Abbot of Vaux sharply condemned 
it on the grounds that a crusade cannot attack a Christian city reigned by a crusader king without 
angering God and damning the participants. He argued that no one who took the crusade vow did 
                                                          
31 Phillips, Fourth Crusade, 110. 
32 Ibid., 112-113. 
33 Geoffrey de Villehardouin, The Conquest of Constantinople, in Caroline Smith, ed., Joinville and 
Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades (New York: Penguin, 2008), 22-24.  
34 Robert de Clari, “Chapter 13: How The Pilgrims Made Yet Another Levy; How The Doge Proposed That 
The Pilgrims Go Against Zara; And Of The Setting Forth Of The Fleet,” in Clari, “Account of the Fourth Crusade.” 
35 Phillips, Fourth Crusade, 111. 
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so for the purpose of attacking fellow Christians. An interesting aspect of the abbot’s argument is 
his distinction to the crusaders that attacking Zara would be unrighteous because “those within it 
are Christians, and you are pilgrims.”36 This implies the scenario may have been weighted 
differently if the army was not on its way to a holy war. Because the expedition was an official 
crusade, however, the abbot, perhaps futilely, argued that it was of utmost importance not to 
attack fellow Christians. He invoked the name of the pope in expressing his argument, hoping 
the supreme pontiff's religious authority would hold a persuasive effect on the crusaders.37 
While, at this point, the abbot’s sharp objections were unlikely descended directly from Rome, 
he was acting as a proxy of the pope and expressing his wishes for the crusade’s strictly religious 
purpose. Arguments against the abbot were synonymous with rejections of the pope’s authority 
over the crusade.  
The theological arguments of the Abbot of Vaux created yet another point at which 
laymen could reject the church's direction. The situation in front of Zara provided an 
opportunity, and indeed a necessity considering the competing ideas expressed by different 
clergymen, for the crusaders to pick and choose which theological arguments to follow. A 
secular alternative to the religious claims made by the clergy, which was espoused by the crusade 
leaders and laymen challenging the clergy’s role, was the notion that the attack would be 
justified as an act of vengeance. The Abbot of Vaux's assertions sparked impassioned backfire 
from the doge.38 Villehardouin reports that the doge, "irritated and troubled" by the 
Abbot's declarations, rallied the crusade leaders against the abbot and tried to convince them of 
the necessity of attacking the city.39 In rejecting the abbot's theological arguments, the doge 
                                                          
36 Villehardouin, Conquest of Constantinople, 20. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Villehardouin, Conquest of Constantinople, 20. 
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made a grand appeal to vengeance, citing past wrongs by the king of Hungary and the manner in 
which the city was originally taken from Venice. The doge disassociated himself from the clergy 
and assumed responsibility for preaching the merits of the attack on Zara.40 In this situation, the 
doge essentially usurped the clergy's power of resolving religious disputes by involving himself 
in the debates between the abbots and contradicting a prominent clergyman, illuminating the 
crusade's crisis of theological authority. 
Clari's narrative adds further that the bishops and lesser clergy of the crusade had to 
debate vehemently prior to agreeing that the attack would be a righteous one.41 The actual 
outcome of the debates is of less significance than the debates themselves, however. It was no 
revolutionary idea to claim that attacks on Christians could be righteous. Peter the Venerable, 
decades earlier, argued that such attacks were even nobler than attacks on Saracens.42 Yet despite 
this precedent, the moral debates at Zara plunged the crusade into a cacophony of competing 
ideas and weakened the clergy’s grasp on the theological moorings of crusaders.   
Despite the outcome of these disagreements, the pope, essentially taking the same 
position as the Abbot of Vaux, sent a letter threatening excommunication to the crusaders if they 
attacked Zara. Clari reports that the citizens of Zara took an active role in requesting Innocent’s 
protection.43 The pope's disapproval and threat of excommunication, however, did little to 
change the minds of those advocating the attack. The pope was rendered irrelevant in the minds 
of many crusaders. The doge's response to hearing the news of the pope's commands illustrates 
                                                          
40 Villehardouin, Conquest of Constantinople, 20. 
41 Robert de Clari, “Chapter 14: How The Pilgrims And The Venetians Went Against Zara; How They 
Attacked It In Despite Of The Pope’s Ban; And How They Took The Town And Divided It,” in Clari, “Account of 
the Fourth Crusade.” 
42 Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Rethinking the Crusades,” The Institute on Religion and Public Life, accessed 
November 30, 2016, http://www.firstthings.com/article/2000/03/rethinking-the-crusades.  
43 Clari, “Chapter 14.”  
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the precedence secular authority held over religious authority in this situation. Clari writes that 
Dandolo remained adamant in his position and proclaimed "that not for all the Pontiff’s 
excommunication would he refrain from avenging himself on them of the city.”44 Not only did 
the doge outright reject the pope's direction, but placed his wanton desire for vengeance high 
above the parameters of Christian law and theology. This is a thought-provoking development in 
the history of the crusades considering both that a retaliatory excommunication would defeat the 
purpose of taking the crusade vow for all those involved and that the Venetians took the cross 
overwhelmingly for reasons of piety, according to Villehardouin and modern scholars.45 This 
situation demonstrates a clear conflict of authority between the Venetians and the papacy with 
which the crusaders sided with Venice. 
Disregard for the pope's letter was not limited to the crusade's Venetian contingent, 
though. The doge's challenge of the pope also caused a split in the nobility over where the 
crusade's allegiances lie, somewhat analogous to that which occurred amongst the clergy. While 
the gross majority of the crusade leaders agreed with the doge, Simon of Montfort 
and Enguerrand of Boves refused to defy the supreme pontiff. Montfort and Boves eventually 
chose to abandon the crusade, in what Schmandt describes as “exercising [their] right to 
disagree,” rather than ignore the pope's desires and risk excommunication.46 
This situation raises questions as to how the dichotomy of religious versus secular was 
balanced at this point in the crusade. Did the crusaders attack Zara because they let political 
matters to overtake completely the crusade’s original purpose? Or was Zara in itself seen as a 
                                                          
44 Clari, “Chapter 14.” 
45 Villehardouin, Conquest of Constantinople, 9-11; Donald E. Queller, Thomas K. Compton and Donald A. 
Campbell, “The Fourth Crusade: The Neglected Majority,” Speculum 49, no. 3 (July 1974): 441-465. 
46 Clari, “Chapter 14;” Schmandt, “Fourth Crusade,” 207. 
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religious objective of the crusade? Or perhaps they allowed political digressions to take place 
while still convincing themselves it was a religious war? While it may be tempting to cast the 
capture of Zara as a political act apart from the crusade or as a practical necessity that was not 
viewed even by the crusaders as a religious objective, primary sources offer a different 
perspective. Villehardouin reports a general consensus among common crusaders that the capture 
was possible only because the army was divinely empowered.47 The doge also endorsed these 
sentiments by proclaiming “we have taken this city by the grace of God” to a meeting of the 
nobility.48 The attack on Zara was thus regarded as a congruous detour of the crusade which was 
divinely sanctioned and in line with the religious purpose Innocent initially laid out for the 
expedition. This intertwining of religious justification with secular Venetian territorial disputes 
demonstrates the theological uncertainty inherent in the crusade’s modified course. 
The Gestae Innocenti, containing many of the pope’s letters from this situation as well as 
primary source commentary, nonetheless corroborates the notion that the pope was against the 
idea of attacking Zara as soon as he heard it. He carefully crafted his response to suggestions of 
attacking Christian cities to ensure he took a stark stance against attacking Christians without 
appearing hostile or authoritarian to the crusade.49 He forbid all attacks on Christians, except on 
the condition that "they wrongfully impeded in their journey, or for some other just and 
necessary reason they could not act otherwise." Even in those situations, Innocent mandated that 
such attacks be approved by a papal legate.50 More problems thus arose when, according to 
the Gestae, the Venetians refused to accept these standards laid by the pope.51 Without sufficient 
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resolution, this was the crusade's political situation going into Zara. Concepts of authority and 
leadership over the crusade were deeply in question. This disagreement between the Venetians 
and the papacy foreshadows the more serious disputes surrounded by the moral dilemmas at 
Zara. Members of the crusade had difficulties accepting papal supremacy even in this limited 
capacity. 
Despite their rejection of the pope’s letter of excommunication and determination to 
proceed in conflict to Innocent’s input, the religious consequences must have troubled the 
crusaders somewhat because it prompted the dispatch of an envoy to Rome to ask for the 
pontiff’s reconsideration. This decision was not immediately agreed upon, however. It resulted 
only after a series of debates and counsels between the crusaders.52 Villehardouin reports that, in 
response to this hastily sent envoy, the pope decided to rescind the excommunication. This 
restored rights of salvation to both the crusaders and the Venetians. The pope’s reasons for 
nullifying his previous condemnation are not fully clear aside from a brief statement that the 
crusade’s actions were forgivable because they were compelled to them through the failures of 
others.53  Innocent seems to permit the crusade’s actions as yet another consequence of large 
parties of crusaders traveling from alternative ports, forcing the lack of funds. Regardless of the 
specifics at work behind the scenes, to the crusade as a whole this scenario only further confused 
ideas of spiritual righteousness. 
The arrival of Alexius after the sack of Zara saw another competing authority entering the 
fray of moral debate in the crusade. King Phillip, Alexius and their associates brought further 
theological uncertainty to the crusaders by claiming authority in religious concerns alongside the 
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factions of clergy, nobles and Venetians already disputing what sanctified the crusade.  King 
Phillip, speaking on behalf of Alexius, claimed the inherently religious purpose of the crusade 
rendered it obligated to restore any righteous monarch to his reign whenever possible.54 
Religious appeals were made on the grounds of vengeance against the unfaithful and 
blasphemous Greeks, similar to notions of vengeance evoked by the doge against Zara, and the 
potential for church unity ending the Great Schism. Church unity was not only a potential 
outcome of accepting the request, it also actively drove the crusaders. A unified church was 
explicitly included in Phillip’s offer, which suggested to the crusaders that “if God grant that you 
restore [Alexius] to his inheritance, he will place the whole empire of Roumania in obedience to 
Rome, from which it has long been separated.”55 This same argument was later used by the 
clergy to justify attacking the city on the basis of Greek rebellion against Roman Christianity and 
disloyalty to the pope.56  
There were extensive conceptions of the Greeks injuring Christendom in past years, and 
various examples of past Byzantine wrongdoing were rife in the minds of crusaders. One such 
ideas was that the Byzantines were held responsible for the ruin of Troy and many Western 
Christians viewed themselves as descendants of Trojans. This very belief was used by the 
crusader Pierre de Bracheux to validate the crusade’s conquest of Byzantine lands.57   
Despite these new appeals to the crusaders by Alexius, the period following the siege of 
Zara put the crusade in a critically fractured and disunited state. Villehardouin writes that the 
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majority of crusaders, “more than half of the host,” disagreed with assenting to yet another 
detour to fulfilling the pilgrimage. Although they participated in the capture of Zara, and the 
moral intricacies that arose from it, many crusaders refused to use the crusade to support Alexius 
at Constantinople. Instead, they intended to send envoys to Walter of Brienne’s party, which was 
travelling independently, demanding to go directly to the Holy Land.58 A further contention 
arose in the crusade army as to the relevance of the crusade’s original purpose. There were some 
in the host who felt that the new plan preempted the old one and, for reasons of both practicality 
and theology, made more sense for the crusade at that point. Perhaps because the original plan of 
capturing Alexandria was kept secret from the bulk of crusaders for so long, there was little or no 
theological connection to that plan. It was not in line with their conceptions of the crusade’s holy 
purpose. This likely augmented concerns of how the crusade was to reach Egypt with so much 
debt already remaining unpaid to the Venetians. This group of crusaders clashed against the 
faction that placed the holy pilgrimage above all else and sought the quickest and most efficient 
way of completing it.59  
To alleviate sentiments of despair caused by the revelation of plans to attack Greek 
Christians, many crusaders turned to the clergy for theological answers. The clergy, however, 
came to the general consensus that an attack on Constantinople was permissible and righteous.60 
Clari represents this as a straightforward decision without much difficulty in the debate. The 
crusaders continually looked to the clergy for guidance and numerous times they directed them 
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with little hesitation to the walls of Constantinople. Yet questions arise as to why the agreement 
of clergy at Constantinople was so dissimilar to meetings of clergy at Zara.  
The Chronicle of Novgorod tells of petitions sent to the pope seeking a middle ground. In 
spite of whatever control over the crusade the pope actually had, many attempts were made to 
influence the crusade through the pope. One petition to the pope by King Phillip suggested 
taking more of a middle stance between the debating factions of crusaders. A compromise was 
proposed wherein the crusade would attempt to peaceably restore Alexius to the throne. If the 
objective cannot be peaceably accomplished, the crusade would send Alexius back to Phillip and 
continue to the Holy Land. This petition is gravely clear, however, that the crusade should "do no 
injury to the Greek land.”61 While it cannot be ascertained from exactly what the pope's eventual 
position on the matter resulted, he remained clear in his condemnation of the attack. Despite the 
ambiguities in his response to the capture of Zara, it was evident to many the pope was against 
attacking Constantinople. The Chronicle explains that in continuing to besiege Constantinople 
after hearing this input "the Franks ... forgot the commands of tsar [Phillip] and pope.”62 The 
crusade was no longer about following the pontiff’s theological example or orders, and it was 
becoming less and less about following established secular authority as well.  
The effect on the crusaders was not as straightforward as the decision itself, however. 
Later in the siege, the crusaders returned once again with questions of their actions’ sanctity. 
They connected their failure with sinfulness, asserting that perhaps they were unable to make 
significant progress in capturing the city due to divine intervention against them.63 
                                                          
61 Robert Mitchell and Nevill Forbes, trans., The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471 (London: Offices of the 
Society, 1914), 44. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Robert de Clari, “Chapter 72: HOW THE BISHOPS ASSURED THE PILGRIMS YET AGAIN THAT IT 
WAS A WORK OF MERIT TO FIGHT THE GREEKS,” in Clari, “Account of the Fourth Crusade.” 
Robinson 21 
To fill the void left by the ambivalent and insufficient direction from the clergy, while 
simultaneously attempting to rationalize their actions in the context of religion, many crusaders 
turned to profound introspection. The crusading army was composed almost primarily of 
volunteers whose laid more so in their crusading vow than the nobility or even the clergy. As 
Schmandt explains, this made the crusaders “highly individualistic, fractious, and accepting 
discipline and control only when it suited their convenience or coincided with their own 
conception of their role.”64 It became common during the crusade for the rank-and-file to assume 
the role of the clergy and take questions of sanctity and morality into their own hands. At this 
stage, the Fourth Crusade became a festering point for individualism. It highlighted the 
rationalizing ability of common crusaders while the clergy and secular leadership were disjointed 
and split by moral debate.  
Theological uncertainty flooded the crusade prior to the commencement of warfare at 
Constantinople. Another moral debate among the crusade came following the death of Alexius. 
At this point, the justification that the crusade was using for the attack--restoring a ruler to his 
rightful throne--lost its relevance. Many of those who previously saw the diversion as righteous 
were now conflicted with the moral implications of continuing the attack without the 
theologically permissible reason they had. The Chronicle of Novgorod explains that many 
crusaders finally became fearful of the pope's condemnation and were "troubled for their 
disobedience."65 The sentiment that it was better "to die at Tsargrad [Constantinople], than to go 
away with shame" started becoming popular.66 Because, as Natasha Hodgson has pointed out, 
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vindictive notions of honor and shame permeated the crusade, this likely factored heavily into 
the moral contemplations of the crusaders.67 
The Hystoria Constantinopolitana suggests there was much more grave disagreement 
about attacking Christians at Zara than the other sources imply. It states that "even in the face of 
importunate pressure, [the crusaders] stubbornly continued to say no. As a result, a good deal of 
time passed in dissentious argument.”68 The crusaders rooted into their principles and were not 
quickly swayed. They not only regarded the plan as despicable, but also considered it flatly 
illegal for crusaders to use their force against Christians.69 The crusaders' disagreement 
transcended simple difference of opinion and became concerned with grand notions of theology 
and sanctity—what is a proper and improper action for a crusade. Passive disagreement does not 
adequately describe this period of the crusade, either, as the crusaders thought their eternal 
salvation may rest on the outcome of the disputes. This left many "frightened to the point of 
terror at the thought of committing an outrage.”70 The crusade's development, from the revelation 
of the plan to attack Zara to the eve of the attack on Constantinople features the common 
crusaders trusting the clergy and nobles less and less with matters of their salvation. 
The same source reasons that the crusaders dismissed their scruples and attacked the city 
because "it seemed to them more pardonable and less blameworthy to secure the greater good 
through means of the lesser evil, rather than to leave their crusade vow unfulfilled.”71 The 
common crusaders, however, are not traditionally the judge of scholastic matters such as 
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different tiers of sinfulness. The crusade as a whole effectively preempted the role of the clergy 
and the pope--the same clergy that bickered amongst itself denying the crusade 
any conclusive stance on the issue and the same pope that failed to maintain authority over his 
own organization. Placed into this unique position, the crusaders prioritized attacking Christians 
over abandoning their vows. 
This is not to imply that the clergy played no role, however limited, in directing the 
crusader's actions in the conquest. The conquest was mostly achieved by the spread of fire and 
calculated siege craft.72 The necessity of brutal combat was restricted to when the crusaders 
entered the city and the pillaging began.73 According to the Hystoria Constantinopolitana, many 
crusaders further refrained as much as possible from bloodlust in the attack because of the pleas 
of several clerics not to shed blood.74 They were not entirely deaf to the advice of the clergy, but 
only followed it when it was convenient and coincided with their own ideas. 
To determine whether the crusaders were in fact righteous, whether by the standards of 
the time or those of modernity, one potential course of action is to look to the legacy of their 
acts. The Latin Empire lasted nearly sixty years. Yet its establishment is regarded as the 
foundation of the Muslim conquest of the city in 1453. The crusade, blending in with many 
previous and later, accomplished little to nothing in securing Christian control of the Holy Land. 
Whether following the lead of the Abbot of Vaux or many other who did not endorse the 
crusade's diversion would have led to a different Middle East delves into the realm of 
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speculation. It is certain, however, that if more credence had been offered to the worries of 
dissenting crusaders, world history had the potential for drastic alteration.  
Venetian Direction in a Theological Context 
While the Venetians desired payment and were partly economically motivated, they were 
even more so influenced by the theological mission of the crusade, as evidenced by 
Villehardouin's detailed discussion of them accepting the cross. Despite its later events, the 
crusade was acknowledged as a strictly holy war during the early negotiations at Venice. 
Villehardouin, who was present at these meetings, writes there was little debate during the 
negotiations for transportation that the crusade's purpose was solely religious.75 The doge and the 
Venetians later took the cross enthusiastically and with immense piety, apparently holding the 
same initial religious purpose to their commitment as the crusaders.76 Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that they would have followed clerical direction if it was much clearer. 
The venetians were indeed quite pious and devoted to the crusade, despite the dangerous 
results of their direction. Many historians view them as traitors to the crusade. Donald Queller 
and Gerald Day refer to this prolific idea as the “treason theory” of the Fourth Crusade.77 
Modern scholarship reveals, however, that most were just as part of the theological situation as 
other crusaders. Queller and Day cite as a primary influence on the “treason theory” the belief 
that the Venetians were indifferent to the religious mission of the crusade.78 
The fact that the venetians controlled so much of the crusade’s route while retaining piety 
makes the situations at Zara and Constantinople all the more thought-provoking. The venetians 
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had a strong hand in directing the events of the crusade, but this was in no way independent from 
the crises of religious authority that occurred en route.  
Demands for Unity take Priority 
Throughout the crusade ideals of unity took precedence over not just certain temporal 
considerations, but eventually overcame crusaders’ religiosity as well. The heavy clerical 
influence from the initial preaching and organization of the host quickly ceased as the crusade 
got underway, however. Innocent's emphasis on theology and the moral reform of Christendom 
was replaced by the crusaders' prioritization of unity in the host above all else. The theological 
concepts from which the crusade was built were overshadowed by the more practical matters of 
the journey. The very unity in the host was equated by Villehardouin with the crusade’s sanctity, 
with his brief digression “that if God had not loved the host, it could never have held together, 
seeing how many people wished evil to it!”79 
When faced with arguments questioning the sanctity of their actions, crusade leaders 
often justified their stance by the need to maintain unity in the host. By breaking from clerical 
directives in this way, and convincing themselves of their actions' sanctity, the crusaders 
effectively locked in the course to Constantinople without needing to answer to traditional 
theological authority. This is most evident in the narratives of Villehardouin and Clari. 
Villehardouin, in particular, emphasizes throughout his chronicle the malevolence of those who 
deserted the host or traveled from alternative ports.80 
The Chronicle of Morea also briefly discusses issues of unity that arose from those 
travelling from other ports. It differs from the other sources, however, in that the only reason it 
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gives for the disunity is "that the route was too long" and neglects to mention various differences 
in agreement about which Clari and Villehardouin seem so adamant.81 
Appeals to unity at the expense of theology came to the forefront on the eve of the siege 
of Zara. Despite numerous complaints about attacking a Christian city and threats of desertion, 
crusade unity took priority. The arguments between the two factions, those who supported the 
attack and those who did not, provide profound insight into the role of traditional clerical 
analysis and the theological dynamics of the crusade. 
 These sentiments continued as the crusade moved toward Constantinople. When faced 
the Alexius’ proposal, the Abbot of Loos made a grand display before the crusaders and, instead 
of appealing to the theology of the matter, argued in favor of the request only for its ability to 
maintain unity in the crusade.82 
Initial Preaching 
Both Villehardouin and Clari open their narratives by discussing the influence of Fulk of 
Neuilly. In many ways, the actions of Fulk set the stage for what the crusade ideally could have 
been in regards to the relationship between the pope and the crusade and the impact of clerical 
preaching on the crusade. Fulk's contributions set up a point by which later events of the crusade 
can be compared to identify changes in clerical and papal authority throughout the expedition. 
Fulk was a priest who earned such renown as a local preacher that Innocent directly authorized 
him to preach the crusade on his behalf. Although it is uncertain exactly where Fulk much of his 
sermons, and thus the extent to which he influenced Christendom on the pope's behalf, Gunther 
of Pairis places him in Flanders, Normandy and Brittany, but is not explicit as to the "other 
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provinces" he may have visited.83 Peter Noble writes that Fulk then became the leading recruiter 
for the crusade and exercised tremendous power over the crusade's development while operating 
under Innocent's authority.84 He was present at the tournament of Ecry and, in addition to 
numerous commoners and knights, was responsible for many of the crusade's influential nobles 
taking the cross.85 Clari's narrative likewise confirms Fulk's pervasive influence and successful 
recruitment throughout the expanses of Christendom, while mentioning that "God wrought very 
great miracles in his behalf; and much substance did this priest obtain to carry to the holy land 
beyond the sea.”86 The crusade became popular in Christendom in large part due to Fulk's tour of 
preaching Innocent's crusade message. 
Historian Andrew W. Jones believes that current historiography improperly presents Fulk 
of Neuilly as an enthusiastic preacher who, despite this characterization, was nonetheless 
insignificant to the crusade’s development. He argues that Fulk played a direct role in the 
recruitment and organization of the crusade and worked with both the pope’s representatives and 
the crusade leaders. Jones shows that Fulk’s style of preaching and rhetoric, based in moral 
reform ideals, was compatible with the crusade’s religious message and thus increased 
recruitment. He further develops this argument to show that Innocent III’s inspiration for the 
crusade was also rooted in his promotion of the moral reform of Christian life. Jones represents 
the crusade as the convergence of moral reform with the crusading ideal. He takes the position 
that, at least during the recruitment phase, the crusade was not a spontaneous accident. He 
believes it was the result of a deliberate effort to establish a crusading force, of which Fulk of 
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Neuilly was an instrumental part.87 Additionally, due to his close association with several of the 
other preaching clergy, some historians believe Fulk actively influenced their individual crusade 
sermons as he encountered them.88 Fulk’s views, fueled by Innocent’s direction, became the 
basis on which much of the crusade’s ideals were built.  
A crusade to the Holy Land was an integral part of Innocent's administration, and he 
expressed deep desire for a holy war when he ascended to the papacy.89 There is a scholarly 
consensus that Innocent took a more active role in planning and leading crusades than any pope 
other than Urban II.90 The pope saw himself as all-powerful over church affairs, along with 
considerable influence over secular activities as well.91 Another defining aspect of the pope's 
administration was his attempts to bring moral reform to Christendom.92 Innocent's agenda of 
moral reform became interconnected with the crusade's preaching, wherein he thought he could 
achieve both goals with a successful crusade to the Holy Land.93 Considering its outcome, this is 
perhaps the greatest irony of the crusade. Innocent foresaw an adamant bond between the 
reformation of a sinful Christendom and a grand pilgrimage to the Holy Land in the form of a 
crusade.94 The latter goal was an undoubtable failure, but whether the crusade contributed to 
Innocent’s vision of Christian morality remains for historians to debate. According to Noble, this 
agenda was transparent in Fulk's crusade preaching.95 Innocent was profoundly invested in Fulk's 
                                                          
87 Andrew W. Jones, “Fulk of Neuilly, Innocent III, and the Preaching of the Fourth Crusade,” Comitatus 41 
(September 2010): 119-148. 
88 Schmandt, “Fourth Crusade,” 202. 
89 Phillips, Fourth Crusade, 4-5. 
90 S.J. Allen and Emilie Amt, The Crusades: A Reader (North York, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 
2014), 216; Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 174; 
Phillips, Fourth Crusade, 3-4. 
91 Riley-Smith, Crusades, 173. 
92 Phillips, Fourth Crusade, 4-5. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Phillips, Fourth Crusade, 4.  
95 Noble, “Old French Chronicles,” 401. 
Robinson 29 
recruitment for the crusade and the crusade's ultimate success. Along with the Fulk's commission 
to preach the cross, Innocent also sent Cardinal Peter Capuano, who later became a papal legate 
imbedded in the crusade, to proclaim the official indulgence for taking the cross.96 Thus, during 
this initial period of the crusade's development, the clergy, under the pope's direct authority, 
exercised a strong influence over the impending holy war. This aspect of the crusade's early 
preaching shows Innocent taking an active role in the expedition's welfare.  
Fulk was not the only cleric to receive a papal mandate to preach, however. Martin of 
Pairis also records that he had a papal commission to preach the crusade. Indeed, this early 
period of the crusade's development shows Innocent amassing a contingent of preachers to 
recruit the crusade under his authority. Some sources suggest Abbot Martin held a leadership 
role among part of the army while traveling to Venice.97 Although historians believe it was much 
more limited than suggested, this gives insight into the level of authority some of the clergy held 
over troops during the crusade's initial travel Although he limited his own preaching, Innocent 
took an active role in ensuring the efforts of others would realize his vision.98 
Despite the widespread influence of Fulk and his contemporaries at the start of the 
crusade, the concept of being led to the cross through clerical preaching was not universal. 
The Chronicle of Morea, rather than opening with the deeds of Fulk like other chronicles, opens 
with Villehardouin convincing the Count of Champagne to take the cross. While Fulk certainly 
exerted a strong degree of influence on the count, especially at the Tournament of Ecry, the 
Chronicle of Morea instead stresses that Villehardouin was responsible for count's final act of 
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commitment.99 While it can be debated how much influence each side had on Thibaud's decision, 
there is further evidence that, even in its early stages, the crusade saw a distinct merging of 
temporal and religious authority. The chronicle records that after Thibaud took the cross, the 
other crusade leaders were content with rendering him the captain of the expedition. Rather than 
outright distilling on Thibaud the honor of captain, however, they first sought and gained 
approval from Innocent. Yet while doing this, they simultaneously sought the pope's indulgence 
and blessing for the entire crusade.100 The chronicle adds that the crusaders were so invested in 
the pope's role in choosing the crusade leadership that they begged him to approve Boniface de 
Montferrat to replace the deceased Thibaud, writing that the crusaders insistently "begged that he 
be pleased to confirm the marquis as general captain of the expedition.”101 The crusade leaders 
saw the pope as the clear spiritual authority reigning over the crusade's religious and penitential 
aspects, but they also placed him in a position of secular authority by giving him organizational 
influence over it.102 The turning point in the crusade occurred between decisions to attack Zara 
and Constantinople when the crusaders began to resent both facets of papal authority in which 
they placed themselves. 
According to his chronicler and his political correspondence, Innocent made a tangential 
command that Alexius III “lead the Greek church back to the obedience of the apostolic see, its 
mother, from whose magisterium it had withdrawn” while initially planning and requesting 
Byzantine support for the crusade in late 1199. Even before the crusade’s destination became 
Byzantium, church unity factored into the pope’s conception of the crusade’s potential.103 
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There is no extant evidence to suggest crusade indulgences differed significantly by the 
time of the Fourth Crusade. While the crusades evolved over their long history, the penitential 
character and practices of crusading remained relatively stable.104 In exchange for fulfilling their 
original crusading vow, crusaders were rewarded with a plenary indulgence forgiving them of 
their previous sins. This relies on the interpretation of sin as a debt to God which can be repaid 
by committing holy acts.105 Villehardouin briefly describes the Fourth Crusade’s indulgences as 
follows: "all who should take the cross and serve in the host for one year, would be delivered 
from all the sins they had committed, and acknowledged in confession.”106 Innocent saw the 
development of a noteworthy change in the conceptualization of crusade indulgences, however. 
He held the view that no one could live a truly holy life without taking some part in the crusades. 
Innocent interpreted refusal to take the cross as direct defiance of God’s wishes.107 The 
penitential nature of the Fourth Crusade, at least in Innocent’s mind, was much stricter than that 
of previous attempts at holy war. 
Thomas Madden suggests that the indulgence is the foundation to understanding any 
crusade. Crusaders, he writes, “were deeply aware of their own sinfulness and anxious over the 
state of their souls,” according to documents they left behind.108 Such anxiety contributed 
doubtlessly to the moral debates and introspection of the Fourth Crusade. Jonathan Riley-Smith 
adds another intriguing take on the incentivizing nature of indulgences, writing “a crusade was 
for the crusader only secondarily about service in arms to God or benefiting the Church or 
Christianity; it was primarily about benefiting himself. He was engaged in an act of self-
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sanctification.”109 This purification that so many aspired to was permitted by serving the church 
in a holy war and placed a personal stake extending beyond simple morality in whether the 
crusade’s events were righteous. The practice of granting crusade indulgences reveals that the 
ecclesiastical foundation had strict authority over the spiritual rewards and incentives of 
participating in the crusade. 
Innocent admits his self-imposed lack of authority against temporal kings and nobility in 
a letter to the prefect Acerbius and the nobles of Tuscany in 1198: 
"Just as the founder of the universe established two great lights in the firmament of 
heaven, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night, so too He set 
two great dignities in the firmament of the universal church..., the greater one to rule the 
day, that is, souls, and the lesser to rule the night, that is, bodies. These dignities are the 
papal authority and the royal power. Now just as the moon derives its light from the sun 
and is indeed lower than it in quantity and quality, in position and in power, so too the 
royal power derives the splendor of its dignity from the pontifical authority...."110 
He self-limited his authority, setting a precedent for his weak involvement in the crusades. 
Aftermath and Legitimization 
The church’s legitimization of the crusade offers insight into the ambivalent direction of 
the clergy, and most notably the pope. Despite Innocent’s marked condemnation of attacks on 
Christians at Zara, the crusade’s aftermath provides a legacy of Innocent’s embrace of the 
outcome. The pope’s changing direction and inability to arrive at a stable position on the matter 
from early in the events at Zara, further show the church’s weak handling of the crusade’s unique 
theological demands.   
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Innocent was incensed at the sack of Constantinople. He saw the attack as direct defiance 
of his clearly stated wishes and his authority over the crusade. He wrote to Peter Capuano, who 
was still representing the pontiff in the crusade, not long after the siege denouncing the crusade's 
events and chastising him for his involvement. One of the pope's main points of concern was 
Peter's relief from their crusade vows all the crusaders who remained to defend the Latin Empire, 
believe he far exceeded his authority and arguing that he "neither should nor could give any such 
absolution.”111 Innocent thus maintained the same tone he took while previously trying to control 
the crusade--that he was the supreme authority over all matters of holy war and religion. He 
laments that the crusade's actions ruined all hope of a union between the Roman and Greek 
churches, while the crusaders brought shame to Western Christians by engaging in bloodlust and 
other heinous acts against the city of Constantinople.112 This rhetoric could have set a powerful 
precedent for the church rejecting the activities, and subsequent, gains of the Fourth Crusade. 
Why did the pope's frustration abate so quickly, though? 
 Nikolaos Chrissis examines how popular abstract philosophical ideas from the crusade 
converged with papal legitimizations of the crusaders’ acts. He argues that, after the crusade, 
several popes used rhetorical themes and motifs associated with Constantinople both to justify 
the crusade and garner support for further defenses of the Latin Empire. He identifies a 
dichotomy which dominated papal representations of Constantinople: the temporal and religious 
importance of the city. Its temporal attributes consisted of its legendary wealth and designation 
as the new Rome, while its religious attributes consisted of its role as a repository of relics, the 
location of many ecumenical councils, its designation as the new Jerusalem and its status as 
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second in patriarchal rank to Rome. Chrissis explains how these points were utilized by the 
popes to legitimize Western control of Constantinople. Chrissis writes that the papacy relied on 
two arguments to justify its defense of the Latin Empire, and thus the crusade. Popes believed 
that control of Constantinople would allow more efficient crusading and would bring the Eastern 
Christians under the authority of Rome. Although he does little to analyze their accuracy, 
Chrissis assists the historiography by identifying these papal interpretations of the crusade.113 
The clergy of the crusade, the very groups who bickered amongst themselves as to the 
attack's religious permissibility, showed a similar embrace of the conquest. Abbot Martin of 
Pairis’ actions from Zara to Constantinople are representative of this phenomenon. Martin, who 
was a Cistercian monk like the Abbot of Vaux, embodied deep contempt for the crusade's detour 
at Zara.114 Martin's contradictory later actions form an excellent illustration of the unique 
religious fluidity that characterized the crusade, though. In the heat of conquest within the walls 
of Constantinople, he readily ignored his past scruples and smuggled sacred Christian relics out 
of the city in the hopes of bringing them back to the west. Although his exact motivations remain 
unclear, it appears Martin resorted to looting because he saw himself as more worthy of it as a 
cleric than the common crusaders.115 The Hystoria Constantinopolitana suggests he initially 
made the decision out of jealousy, recording he "began to think also about his own booty and, 
lest he remain empty-handed while everyone else got rich, he resolved to use his own 
consecrated hands for pillage."116 Yet, in keeping with the crusade's character, Martin had to 
independently persuade himself that his actions were righteous. He resolved that it 
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was "improper to commit sacrilege except in a holy cause."117 He convinced himself that looting 
Byzantine religious relics would be theologically permissible because of his status as a 
representative of the church, much how the crusaders convinced themselves to attack the city.118 
It is unclear how much Martin's religious sentiments actually changed because, despite his 
belated support for the sack, Martin limited his own benefit from it. He declined an offer to 
become a bishop in favor of staying with what was left of the crusade to fulfill his vow and 
returning to Pairis with humility119. After successfully displacing numerous relics during the 
looting, however, he reflected on his acts and simply remarked "we have done well."120 
 Clerical sentiments about the Fourth Crusade’s aftermath are also evident in the decisions 
passed by the Fourth Lateran Council. Although some individual clergymen brought the crusade 
in line with their theology on the eve of the sack of Constantinople, the Clergy, as a general 
institution, exercised weak control over the crusade in general. 
Final Thoughts 
The purpose of this argument is not to place blame on the clergy or to explain the 
crusade's diversion. Rather, it is to illuminate the theological intricacies inherent in the Fourth 
Crusade and analyze the significance of the clergy when placed into this anomalous situation. 
Following the plunder of countless sacred relics, and the bloodshed that accompanied it, the 
crusaders began to establish order in the city under the new authority of the Latin Empire. The 
crusaders remaining in the city then celebrated Holy Week and practiced their religion with 
                                                          
117 Andrea, Hystoria Constantinopolitana, 121-123. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., 125-126. 
120 Ibid., 123-124. 
Robinson 36 
almost no regard to the circumstances which brought them to Constantinople.121 They carried on 
their religious practices as if there was no dispute over the sanctity of their situation. 
Evidence exists suggesting that the Byzantines did not blame the pope for the crusade, 
even though it was fundamentally his own creation. They did, however, blame the Latin clergy 
for the holy war's corruption. The Byzantines saw it more fitting to accuse the agents of the 
Latin Church for the disaster rather than the head of the same church. This is further evidence 
that, at least in the eyes of some, the clergy was separated from the papal institutions during the 
crusade. In fact, they trusted the pope enough to ask him to mediate the relationship between the 
Latins and the Greeks.122 
 Despite the scrupulous justification the crusaders went through to validate their 
actions, the Byzantines still viewed the crusade as a corrupt and unholy war.123 The Byzantine 
ruler of Nicaea accused the crusaders of apostasy for diverting a holy cause to cause Christian 
suffering.124 Nicetas Choniates, likewise noting the inherently religious consequences of the 
crusade, viewed the attack as "madness against God himself."125 The Byzantines were thus much 
less favorable to the crusaders' moral justifications than Western Christians and rejected their 
reconciliations of their actions with the faith. It is also intriguing to recognize that, although the 
Byzantine rulers were more forgiving of the pope than the crusaders, the Nicaean governor partly 
assumed the pope's, or the Greek patriarch's, authority of excommunication in declaring the 
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crusaders apostates. The circumstances likely became dire enough that some Byzantines' 
theology was altered after the Latin conquest in a similar way to that of the crusaders. 
Considering the pope's belated acceptance of what the crusade brought the church, his 
ambivalence is further developed in a letter he sent to the Byzantines. The letter begins with the 
pope's expression of regret for what the crusade became. His anger at the crusade's defiance is 
just as prominent as in the previous and more well-known letter he sent Peter Capuano. Yet the 
pope takes the issue much farther when writing to the Greeks. He argues that the crusaders, as 
well as the Eastern Christians, were not only heretical but outright "evil." He writes that the 
crusade was "God's way to use evil to punish evil people."126 Innocent placed both the crusaders 
and the Greeks at the absolute bottom of the Christian hierarchy, as enemies of the church, while 
simultaneously embracing the same divine intervention theory that many of the crusaders 
endorsed. Despite his concerns in this particular letter, Innocent became concerned with 
maintaining his image in the eyes of the Greeks and used that as further justification for 
distancing himself from the crusade.127 
Gunther of Pairis goes so far as to claim a divine mandate for the crusade, in spite of the 
crusaders' actions. Because the acts were committed during the execution of a holy war, they 
must be considered part of God's commands. He requests that his readers ignore the impiety 
implied by such acts and instead focus on the holy purpose of the crusade.128 
Pope John Paul II, addressing the Patriarch of Athens in 2001, reflected on the crusade 
and how it still affected relations between the Greek and Roman churches into the twenty-first 
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century. Taking an opinion shared by many of crusaders and crusade clergy, though some 
adamantly and others only temporarily, the pontiff announced that "it is tragic that the assailants, 
who had set out to secure free access for Christians to the Holy Land, turned against their own 
brothers in the faith. The fact that they were Latin Christians fills Catholics with deep regret. 
How can we fail to see here the mysterium iniquitatis at work in the human heart?"129 John Paul 
II further appealed to the church unity that Innocent came to envision as a positive result of 
the distorted crusade, but never truly accomplished. Throughout 
the dialogue he unfalteringly acknowledged that, despite the "deep wounds" left by past meetings 
of the churches, "the Catholic Church is irrevocably committed to the path of unity with all the 
Churches. Only in this way will the one People of God shine forth in the world as the sign and 
instrument of intimate union with God and of the unity of the entire human race."130 
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